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COMMENTS
COMMENT: THE 1979 CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES
James W. Spears*
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent, noteworthy action of the Arkansas Supreme Court is
embodied in Per Curiam Order No. 78-54, dated December 18, 1978,
whereby the court, acting under authority of Arkansas Act 38 of
1973' and its constitutional and inherent powers to regulate prac-
tice, adopted, with some modifications, a set of rules of procedure
for civil cases submitted to it by its Civil Procedure Revision Com-
mittee headed by Judge Andrew G. Ponder of Newport, Arkansas.
The complete set of rules consists of three major sections designated
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Rules
for Inferior Courts. Because the effective date of the rules is July 1,
1979, the full set will be referred to herein as the 1979 Civil Proce-
dure Rules.2
This commentary is confined to some of the more interesting
features of the Rules of Civil Procedure for circuit, chancery, and
probate courts which are based on the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure [Fed. R. Civ. P.]. More detailed analysis will be appropriate
as the bench and bar gain experience under the new rules. Readers
interested in the history of Arkansas procedures are referred to Dean
Ralph Barnhart's excellent article on the subject.3
Much of the new procedure will be familiar to Arkansas law-
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock; B.S.I.E., University of Arkan-
sas, Fayetteville, 1958; J.D., University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, 1964; LL.M., University
of Texas at Austin, 1972.
1. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-245 to 249 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
2. There has been some difficulty with citation form. The only reference to the full set
of rules seems to be "RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE" or "ARKANSAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE"
which more properly refers to the section governing circuit, chancery, and probate courts and
which is abbreviated "ARCP" in Rule 85. This and "ARKANSAS RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE" found in Rule 1 of the appellate rules appear to be the only court-approved
citation forms at this time. The advance copy from Michie Bobbs-Merrill, the publisher of
the Arkansas Statutes Annotated, uses the following designations: "RCP" for the rules of civil
procedure, "RAP" for the appellate rules, and "RIC" for the inferior court rules; these are
designated herein as ARK. R. Civ. P., ARK. R. APP. P., and ARK. R. INF. C., respectively. The
entire collection of rules is designated as the 1979 CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES.
3. Barnhart, Pleading Reform in Arkansas, 7 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1952). Notwithstanding
the passage of 27 years, this treatment remains the leading reference on Arkansas procedure,
especially from an historical point of view.
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yers. Our procedures were "modernized" in 1869 by the adoption of
a code similar to the "Field Codes"4 of New York, Alabama, and
particularly Kentucky.5 Some of the provisions of the Civil Code of
1869 are now found in title 27, chapter 6 of the Arkansas Statutes
Annotated, which deals with venue; they will remain in effect due
to the slightly differing scope of the 1979 Rules.6 In addition, por-
tions of the Fed. R. Civ. P., having been added to our procedural
rules from time to time, are already in force in Arkansas. Because
of the piecemeal adoption of provisions, however, some of the fed-
eral models engrafted into Arkansas procedure were older versions
of federal rules while others were adopted without considering their
frame of reference. Most of these limitations are cured by the new
code.
II. FEDERAL RULES INCORPORATED INTO ARKANSAS
PRACTICE
Among the Federal Rules already in force in Arkansas are Fed.
R. Civ. P. 141 (Third Party Practice) and 568 (Summary Judgments)
which differ from the Arkansas enactments only by the elimination
of portions that apply to federal practice. In addition, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 16 (Pretrial Conference) adopted in the new rules, differs some-
what in wording and organization from the prior Arkansas enact-
ment,' but the differences appear to be more in form than in sub-
stance.
The former Arkansas discovery rules 0 were based on an early
version of the federal rules while those in the new code are patterned
on the 1970 version. The differences, however, are primarily in the
4. These codes were named after David Dudley Field, the leading draftsman of the first
such code which was enacted in New York in 1848. See also Barnhart, supra note 3, at 14.
One copy of the 1869 Arkansas version of the Field Code can be found in the UALR-
Pulaski County Law Library in a volume entitled ARKANSAS CODE. This volume contains both
the civil and criminal codes. Hereafter, the collection will be cited as ARKANSAS CODE (1869),
while the civil portion will be designated Civil Code (1869).
5. Barnhart, supra note 3, at 14. See also ARKANSAS CODE (1869). Remnants of this
nineteenth-century code can be found in title 27 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated under
the heading "Civil Code," located in the history commentary.
6. This may be due to the fact that, like the Field Code in New York, the Civil Code
(1869) was implemented by statute rather than by court order. See Barnhart, supra note 3,
at 14; ARKANSAS CODE (1869).
7. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1134.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Prior to 1975 the only such provision
was ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1007 (1962) which provided only for impleader of joint tortfeasors.
That section is not among those specifically superseded by the 1979 Rules.
8. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 29-211 (1962 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
9. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-2401 to 2403 (1962).
10. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-348 to 361 (1962).
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nature of reorganization and codification of matters which had pre-
viously been the subject of interpretation by case law. The new rules
codify an expanded version of the Hickman v. Taylor" "work prod-
uct" privilege which has been recognized in Arkansas" and the dis-
coverability of liability insurance coverage which appears to be new
to Arkansas practice.'"
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure [Ark. R. Civ. P.] 31 pro-
vides for depositions upon written questions and supersedes a por-
tion of the Arkansas statute dealing with depositions on written
interrogatories.' 4 Apparently retained are provisions in the same
statute for interrogatories annexed to pleadings'5 and for deposition
on interrogatories" where the parties are out of state or numerous
11. 329 U.S. 495 (1945).
12. See Dritt v. Morris, 235 Ark. 40, 357 S.W.2d 13 (1962).
13. ARK. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) and Reporters' Note 1 to Rule 26.
14. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-353(1) (1962).
15. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-353(3) (1962), which provides as follows:
(3) Interrogatories Annexed to Pleadings in the Circuit, Chancery and Pro-
bate Courts of This State.
(a) Interrogatories to Adverse Parties. In all proceedings in the Circuit, Chan-
cery and Probate Court [Courts], either party may annex to the complaint, answer
or reply, written interrogatories to any one or more of the adverse parties, concern-
ing any of the material matters in issue in the proceeding. The answers to which,
on oath, may be read by either party, as a deposition between the party interrogat-
ing and the party answering.
(b) . . ..
(c) Time for Answering. Where the interrogatories are annexed to the com-
plaint, they shall be answered at the same time the party is required to answer the
complaint; where annexed to the answer or reply, then in twenty (20) days after
notice shall be given of the filing thereof to the adverse party or his attorney: but
if answered twenty (20) days before the action stands regularly for trial, the action
shall not be postponed on account of their not being sooner answered.
(d) Trial of Cause after Failure to Answer. The trial of an action shall not be
postponed on account of the failure to answer the interrogatories, if the party
interrogated is present in court at the trial so that he may be orally examined; nor
in case of his absence, without an affidavit showing the facts the party believes will
be proved by the answers thereto, and that the party has not filed the interrogato-
ries, nor omitted to file them for the purpose of delay. Whereupon, if the party will
consent that the facts stated in the affidavit shall be considered as admitted by
those interrogated, the trial shall not be postponed for that cause.
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-353(2) (1962) which states as follows:
(2) When Service Cannot Be Obtained on the Other Party in Proceedings in the
Circuit, Chancery and Probate Courts of this State.
(a) Grounds. The court, on motion of either party, may permit depositions
to be taken upon interrogatories,
(1) Where the party against whom the depositions are to be read is absent
from the State and has not appointed an agent or attorney in the county where the
action is pending, known to the party taking a deposition, or
(2) Where the parties against whom the deposition is to be read are numerous
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and have not designated local agents or attorneys for service of
notice. Both provisions were added to the Arkansas counterpart of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 31 pertaining to what is now called "deposition on
written questions,"' 7 and the context of the reference to deposition
on interrogatories previously referred to clearly indicates that the
reference is to deposition on written questions, not interrogatories.
On the other hand, the provision for interrogatories annexed to
pleadings refers to a form of interrogatories to parties now covered
in Ark. R. Civ. P. 33, but it differs in the manner of service and in
the consequences of failure to answer.'" While both provisions are
omitted from the table of superseded statutes, it is possible that
they are covered by the general supersession rule since they touch
upon the subject matter of other rules. The question of the continu-
ing vitality of the rule is murky since at least one of them adds to
the provisions of a rule which might supersede it.
The provision for interrogatories annexed to pleadings' 9 can
have consequences similar to those under Ark. R. Civ. P. 36 where
the interrogatories are accompanied by the requisite affidavit and
the other party does not answer, but this provision goes further by
permitting the court to rule that the claim or defense which is the
subject of the affidavit has been established by the adverse party's
failure to answer the interrogatories 9 The consequence of failure to
respond under Ark. R. Civ. P. 36, on the other hand, is limited to
admission of the specific matters covered in the request for admis-
sion. Some admissions could, of course, be dispositive of the case
and a similar result might be reached under Ark. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(A)2' for failure to respond to other discovery orders. It is
and have not designated agents or attorneys residing in the county on whom notice
may be served.
17. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-353 (1962) uses older terminology which has been changed in
the 1979 CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES to correspond with the language of the 1970 federal discovery
rules. No doubt, that change was prompted by the propensity of the old language for confu-
sion with interrogatories to parties.
18. Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-353(d) (1962), supra note 15, with ARK. R. Civ. P.
33(a) which provides that the party submitting the interrogatories may move for an order
under ARK. R. CIv. P. 37(a) with respect to a failure to answer. See text at note 20 infra.
19. See the statute quoted note 15 supra.
20. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-353(3)(d) (1962).
21. ARK. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) states as follows:
(2) Sanctions By Court In Which Action Is Pending. If a person or an officer,
director or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30 (b)(6)
or 31 (a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35,
the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the
failure as are just, and among others the following:
[Vol. 2:89
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also recognized that several provisions in the present discovery stat-
utes which are clearly covered by the new code have been omitted
from the list of statutes specifically superseded;" nevertheless, until
there has been a clear holding to the contrary, this writer will as-
sume that at least the provision for interrogatories annexed to
pleadings has not been superseded.
III. A FEDERAL RULE RESTORED TO PROPER CONTEXT
The most obvious instance of a federal rule previously adopted
out of context is the one patterned on the pre-1966 Federal Rule
governing permissive joinder of parties." The context problem arises
because many multiple-parties situations also involve multiple
claims; therefore, the state adoption of Fed. R. Civ. P. 2024 must be
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining
the order;
22. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-348 (depositions pending action), -349 (perpetuation
of testimony), -350 (persons before whom depositions may be taken) (1962).
23. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-806, -807 (1962) which provided as follows:
27-806. Who May Join as Plaintiffs or Defendants.-All persons may join in
one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the-
alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of
them will arise in the action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants
if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right
to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them
will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining
or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or
more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one
or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.
(Emphasis added).
27-807. Preventing Improper Joinder-Separate trials.-The court may make
such orders as will prevent a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to
expense by the inclusion of a party against whom he asserts no claim and who
asserts no claim against him, and may order separate trials or make other orders
to prevent delay or prejudice.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 20 provides as follows:
PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurr-
ences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in
the action. All persons (and any vessel, cargo or other property subject to admiralty
process in rem) may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against
them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurr-
ences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
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accompanied by adoption of Fed. R. Civ. P. 18,25 the joinder of
actions section, if the aim of liberal joinder is to reach its full poten-
tial.2" Previously, Arkansas had an older type of Field Code joinder
of actions provision which, among other things, restricted joinder to
actions falling within one of seven categories described in the rule.27
The addition of a "transaction clause" in 19672 probably liberalized
joinder enough to permit crossing the barriers between categories in
most cases in which it would be desirable to do so, but the new Ark.
action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending
against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the
plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more
defendants according to their respective liabilities.
(b) Separate Trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent a party
from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party
against whom he asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against him and may
order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice.
As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966 (emphasis added).
25. FED R. Civ. P. 18 provides as follows:
JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND REMEDIES
(a) Joinder of Claims. A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or
as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against
an opposing party.
(b) Joinder of Remedies; Fraudulent Conveyances. Whenever a claim is one
heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion,
the two claims may be joined in a single action; but the court shall grant relief in
that action only in accordance with the relative substantive rights of the parties.
In particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for money and a claim to have set aside
a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first having obtained a judgment estab-
lishing the claim for money.
As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966.
26. See Barnhart, supra note 3, at 21.
27. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1301 (1962) states as follows:
What Causes of Action May Be Joined.-Several causes of action may be
united in the same complaint, where each affects all the parties to the action, may
be brought in the same county, be prosecuted by the same kind of proceedings, and
all belong to one of the following classes:
First. Claims arising out of contracts, express or implied.
Second. Claims for the recovery of specific real property, and the rents, prof-
its and damages for withholding the same.
Third. Claims for the recovery of specific personal property, and damages for
the taking or withholding the same.
Fourth. Claims for partition of real or personal property, or both.
Fifth. Claims arising from injuries of character.
Sixth. Claims arising from injuries to person and property.
Seventh. Claims against a trustee by virtue of a contract or by operation of
law.
28. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1301 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This amendment added an eighth
category of actions which could be joined; it is as follows: "Eighth. Claims arising out of the
same transaction or transactions connected with the subject of action, whether in contract,
tort, either, both or otherwise."
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R. Civ. P. 18(a), which is the same as its federal counterpart in this
respect,2 has completed-the task by eliminating the categories alto-
gether.
Arkansas' adoption of the current Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 and 20 may
have another liberalizing effect. Suppose a plaintiff wanted to join
three co-makers of a single promissory note in an action on the note.
It is fairly clear that even the most restrictive joinder requirements
would be satisfied; joinder might even be required in some jurisdic-
tions. Suppose, however, that the plaintiff also wants to state a
claim on a separate promissory note against only one of the three
defendants. Problems of interpretation of the language used in the
pre-1966 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a),30 which referred back to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20,31 led some courts to interpret Fed. R. Civ. P.
20(a) as requiring the "common question" to exist not only between
the defendants joined but also between the actions joined.2 Under
this interpretation, the tacking on of additional claims against a
single defendant was not permissible; the same result would seem
to have been mandated under the Arkansas requirement that the
29. See the rule quoted note 25 supra.
30. Prior to 1966, FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) read as follows:
(a) Joinder of Claims. The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting forth
a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim may
join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims either legal or
equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party. There may be a like
joinder of claims when there are multiple parties if the requirements of Rules 19,
20, and 22 are satisfied. There may be a like joinder of cross-claims or third-party
claims if the requirements of Rules 13 and 14 respectively are satisfied.
(Emphasis added).
31. Prior to 1966, FED. R. Civ. P. 20 read as follows:
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurr-
ences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the
action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect
of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in
the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending
against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the
plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more
defendants according to their respective liabilities.
(b) Separate Trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent a party
from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party
against whom he asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against him, and may
order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice.
(Emphasis added).
32. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, § 78 (3d ed. 1977) (citing Federal Hous. Adm'r v.
Christianson, 26 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1939)).
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actions joined affect all the parties.3 Liberal joinder being favored,
the federal rules were amended in 1966 to eliminate language prob-
lems and the necessity for cross referencing Rules 20 and 18(a). As
a result of the 1966 amendment, tacking on as previously described
would be permissible. The new Ark. R. Civ. P. 20(a)34 and 18(a)35
follow the post-1966 federal rules in this respect36 and presumably
adopt the intent of the 1966 amendments as well.
31
While it can safely be said that Arkansas has now completed
its joinder reform by adopting Fed. R. Civ. P. 18, there are a few
language differences which should be considered. The first of these
appears in Ark. R. Civ. P. 18(a)3 and (b)"I relating to the split
33. The introductory paragraph to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1301 (Cum. Supp. 1977) stated
as follows: "Several causes of action may be united in the same complaint, where each affects
all the parties to the action . . . ." (emphasis added).
34. ARK. R. Civ. P. 20 provides as follows:
PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurr-
ences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in
the action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect
of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise
in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defend-
ing against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the
plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more
defendants according to their respective liabilities.
(b) Separate Trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent a party
from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party
against whom he asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against him and may
order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice.
(Emphasis added). Compare the federal rule quoted note 24 supra.
35. ARK. R. Civ. P. 18(a), a modified version of FED. R. Cirv. P. 18(a), provides as follows:
JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND REMEDIES
(a) Joinder of Claims. A party asserting a claim for relief as an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim may join, either as independent or
as alternative claims, as many claims as he may have against an opposing party,
provided, that nothing herein shall affect the obligation of a party under Rule 13
(a).
36. ARK. R. Civ. P. 20 also omits some maritime references which were added to the
federal version when the admiralty practice was incorporated into the federal rules, but, since
maritime actions in state courts are tried as civil actions, this omission may be disregarded.
37. See C. WIGHT, supra note 32. See also the Advisory Committee's comments to the
1966 amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 18.
38. See the Arkansas rule quoted note 35 supra.
39. ARK. R. Civ. P. 18(b) provides as follows: "Severance and Transfer. The trial court
may make appropriate orders affecting severance of claims and may transfer claims between
courts of law and equity on appropriate jurisdictional grounds."
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between law and equity in Arkansas, but, since severance and trans-
fer of claims are contemplated rather than a preclusion of joinder
at the outset, these differences present no cause for concern.There
is, however, a final clause in Ark. R. Civ. P. 18(a)10 which indicates
that the permissive language of Ark. R. Civ. P. 18(a) does not relieve
litigants from the compulsory counterclaim requirements of Ark. R.
Civ. P. 13(a). 4 This clause may be more far reaching than it at first
appears.
Ordinarily, a plaintiff is not required to join related claims
against a defendant, but a defendant is required to assert related
counterclaims and is permitted to assert others.2 Suppose a defen-
dant asserts a permissive counterclaim and the plaintiff has unfiled
claims which relate to that counterclaim. Is the plaintiff now re-
quired to counterclaim against the counterclaim? While the author-
ities seem scarce, at least one federal case seems to have proceeded
on that assumption 3 and the final clause in Ark. R. Civ. P. 18(a)"
seems to reinforce that argument. This might have been regarded
as intolerable under the previous Arkansas practice which regarded
all counterclaims as compulsory, 5 but it is at least an arguable
possibility under the new Ark. R. Civ. P. 13(a) and (b)'6 which
40. See the Arkansas rule quoted note 35 supra.
41. ARK. R. Civ. P. 13(a) provides as follows:
COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which, at the time of filing the pleading, the pleader has against any opposing
party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need
not state the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the
subject of another pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his
claim by attachment or other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdic-
tion to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating
any counterclaim under this Rule 13.
42. "Related," in this context, refers to the type of relationship described in ARK. R.
Civ. P. 13(a) as a test for determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory. See the Arkan-
sas rule quoted note 41 supra.
43. See Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1961).
44. See the Arkansas rule quoted note 35 supra.
45. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1121 (1962) as interpreted by the Arkansas Supreme Court in
May v. Exxon Corp., 256 Ark. 865, 512 S.W.2d 11 (1974). While criticized as a correct but
unfortunate decision, see 29 ARK. L. REV. 122 (1975), the May view of counterclaims at least
provided an element of certainty that some lawyers may miss in the new ARK. R. CIv. P. 13(a)
and (b). The federal approach, while not confined to federal practice, is more or less man-
dated by jurisdictional considerations which are inapplicable to state practice. If a distinction
between compulsory and permissive counterclaims is to be recognized, however, the federal
approach would seem to be the best choice.
46. ARK. R. Civ. P. 13(b) states as follows: "Permissive Counterclaim. A pleading may
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adopts the federal and generally prevailing distinction between
compulsory and permissive counterclaims.
Even under the 1979 Civil Procedure Rules a required election
of remedy may dictate the form of the action and, thus, restrict the
application of the joinder provision. In Rastle v. Marion County
School District No. 1,41 a school teacher sued for damages for breach
of the contract and, in the alternative, for mandamus to compel the
payment of his salary. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the
actions could not be joined because mandamus involved a special
procedure48 which conflicted with the procedures governing ordinary
civil actions. 49 Rastle was decided under the former Arkansas join-
der of actions statute0 which contained a requirement that actions
joined be triable by the same proceedings. Although the new Ark.
R. Civ. P. 181' does not contain that express requirement, under Ark.
R. Civ. P. 81(a) the new procedure rules do not apply to those
remedies in which statutes prescribe a different procedure; thus, the
result under the new rules would be the same as in Rastle if an
attempt were made to join a remedy which was subject to a proce-
dure in conflict with the procedure for the alternative relief sought.
IV. PROVISIONS DIFFERING FROM THE FEDERAL RULES
Most of the deviations from the Fed. R. Civ. P. are simply
adaptations of the federal rules to state practice through the elimi-
nation of provisions that relate only to the federal courts. 52 Other
differences merely express a preference for the current state prac-
tice, while still others seem to be dictated by limitations in the scope
of the enabling act or imposed by the Arkansas Constitution, or a
combination of these reasons. The reason is not always clear on the
face of the provision.
Among the deviations from the federal pattern apparently im-
state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."
47. 260 Ark. 740, 543 S.W.2d 923 (1976).
48. No adequate definition of "special proceedings" is found in either the present or the
new rules. Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-105 to 107 (1962) with ARK. R. Civ. P. 1, 2, and
81. It is fairly clear, however, that a special proceeding, as distinguished from an ordinary
"civil action," is a remedy or proceeding governed by special statutory procedures. Many of
these are found in titles 31 through 36 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated.
49. Rastle v. Marion County Rural School Dist. No. 1, 260 Ark. 740, 543 S.W.2d 923
(1976).
50. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1301 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See the quoted statute in notes 27
and 28 supra.
51. See notes 35 and 39 supra.
52. E.g., references to admiralty and maritime practice.
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posed by limitations in the enabling act are the retention of separate
law and equity courts. 53 Curiously enough, Arkansas, like most Field
Code states, had merged law and equity courts but with separate
law and equity proceedings.51 Recognition of this can be found in the
Arkansas Constitution." Eventually, however, separate chancery
courts were created in various counties and in 1903 a separate sys-
tem of chancery courts was created by statute.56 Since Arkansas Act
38 of 1973 did not extend to court reorganization, the separate chan-
cery courts remain. The separation is probably more apparent than
real, however, since the same rules of procedure are applicable to
both courts, 7 and an action filed in the wrong forum is subject to
transfer rather than dismissal.18
One deviation probably influenced by limitations imposed by
the Arkansas Constitution is the provision in Ark. R. Civ. P. 51 that
the judge instruct the jury before arguments of counsel, as in the
previous Arkansas practice, 59 rather than after argument as in the
federal version. This rule seems to recognize the fact that, in the
federal system, the judge may comment on the evidence ° and thus
make his instructions clearer to the jury; whereas in Arkansas the
judge may only instruct the jury on the law6' and thus leave to
counsel the job of relating the evidence to the instructions.
The reasons for some deviations are not so clear, however. Rec-
ognizing that a party at the pleading stage may not be certain of
the exact facts, 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(e)(2) explicitly permits pleading
claims or defenses alternately or hypothetically and without regard
to consistency. The version adopted for Arkansas, however, omits
that language and therefore revives doubts concerning the permissi-
bility of pleading inconsistently at a time when the Arkansas Su-
53. ARK. R. Civ. P. 2.
54. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-204 (civil actions divided into law and equity), -
205 (equity jurisdiction), -206 (remedy at law), -208 (error as to proceeding) (1962).
55. ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 15.
56. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-401 (1962); see also Smith & Nixon, La Dolca Vita-Law and
Equity Merged At Last!, 24 ARK. L. REV. 162, 165-72 (1970). This otherwise good article is
marred by a title suggesting that the courts of law and equity have recently been merged in
Arkansas. In fact, the article dealt with the provision for merger contained in the proposed
Arkansas Constitution of 1970, which was defeated subsequent to publication of the article.
57. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-103 (1962); ARK. R. Civ. P. 1.
58. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-405, 27-208 (1962); see ARK. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), 15(b).
59. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1727 (1962).
60. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 7.14 (2d ed. 1977).
61. ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 23.
62. See generally Barnhart, supra note 3.
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preme Court seemed to have moved in the direction of permitting
inconsistent pleading when done in good faith. 3
V. PROPOSED ARKANSAS RULES MODIFIED BY THE
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
Possibly the most noteworthy deviations from the federal rules
are those provisions in which the Arkansas Supreme Court revised
the proposals submitted by the Committee. One revision deals with
class actions and their prerequisites." The traditional class action
is predicated on a community of interest among the class in the
sense of a right which is common to the class. This view reflects its
historical origin as a device for coping with necessary parties where
the number is large or unascertainable15 The 1966 version of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23 also recognized a class based on rights which were
several but involved a predominating common question of law or
fact. The Civil Procedure Revision Committee proposed a con-
densed version, patterned after the rule adopted in Massachusetts
and Rhode Island, which seemed to recognize the so-called
"common question class" without recognizing the privilege of opting
out, as under the federal version, when the rights involved were
several. s7 The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, revised the pro-
63. See Allen v. First Nat'l Bank, 230 Ark. 201, 321 S.W.2d 750 (1959). Alternate
contentions that a testator was incompetent to make a will or that, if he were competent,
the other claimants had chosen to take only a small part of the estate were upheld against a
motion to require an election because of inconsistency. The court stated that inconsistent
theories were permissible in equity under the proper circumstances, such as not knowing at
the pleading stage which contention was correct. Allen was relied on by the court in Odom
v. Odom, 232 Ark. 229, 535 S.W.2d 301 (1960) where, in a partition suit by a widow who
claimed through deeds from heirs of her deceased husband, she was allowed to join an
alternate count that she be declared owner as survivor of an estate by the entirety. An election
of remedies was not required. While neither case involved an outright contradiction of fact,
the reasoning of the Allen case would seem to permit it under proper circumstances. In a like
manner there seems to be no good reason to restrict the Allen holding to equity cases since
the present code and the 1979 Rules of Civil Procedure apply to both circuit and chancery
practice.
64. ARK. R. Civ. P. 23.
65. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 60, at § 10.18.
66. Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Proposal to the Supreme Court by the Civil
Procedure Revision Committee, Rule 23 (1978).
67. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) which states as follows:
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasona-
ble effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him
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posed Ark. R. Civ. P. 23(a) by restoring the language of the present
Arkansas class action statute 8 and, presumably, the gloss which
had been applied to it. At least one case can be cited for having
rejected the common question class in Arkansas practice,69 and the
case apparently remains precedent.
The basis for another revision implemented in the new rules is
difficult to discern. Arkansas formerly had a typical Field Code
requirement that a complaint state "facts constituting the plain-
tiffs cause of action," 70 a reasonable requirement liberally applied.
The problem is that the word "facts" and the phrase "cause of
action" have developed unfortunate connotations which tended to
defeat the purpose of simplified pleading envisioned by the fra-
mers. 7' One of the problems posed by the concept "facts" was that
it became necessary to distinguish between pleading "evidence,"
"facts," and "conclusions of law" for the purpose of determining
whether a complaint was insufficient.7" This, of course, meant that
demurrers were often decided more on the basis of the technicalities
of pleading than on what the pleading showed about the merits of
the pleader's case. For example, in one Arkansas case the plaintiff
was injured while examining defendant's automobile which started
to roll and knocked plaintiff to the ground. In his complaint, plain-
tiff alleged that his injuries were caused by defendant's negligent
failure to tell him that the automobile had not been placed in gear
and that the emergency brake had not been set. The court sustained
the demurrer to the complaint, holding that plaintiff had stated
conclusions rather than facts. Plaintiff's failure to allege that defen-
dant had knowledge of these defects as well as his failure to allege
what caused the car to roll rendered his complaint demurrable.
73
Although plaintiff certainly did not allege all the "facts" which he
from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether
favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C)
any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance
through his counsel.
68. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-809 (1962).
69. Ross v. Arkansas Communities, Inc., 258 Ark. 925, 529 S.W.2d 876 (1975).
70. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1113 (1962).
71. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 60, at §§ 2.5 to 2.9; Barnhart, supra note 3,
at 16.
72. Id.
73. Vandevier v. Chapman, 255 Ark. 1039, 505 S.W.2d 495 (1974). At the other extreme,
pleading of evidence seems not to have been treated so harshly. In one case, the pleader stated
all of the facts necessary to constitute ratification but did not use that specific word. The
court held that this was not objectionable where the adverse party had notice of the pleader's
position. City of Fort Smith v. Bates, 260 Ark. 777, 544 S.W.2d 525 (1976).
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would have to prove in order to recover, it appears that he said
enough to identify the action for purposes of res judicata and deter-
mination of the legal basis for his claim. The framers of the federal
rules apparently substituted the phrase "a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" in
order to overcome the judicial construction of the phrase "facts
constituting a cause of action."'" Even under the more liberalized
federal approach it appears that the pleader must state more than
a grievance, but as to how much more, two schools of thought have
arisen. 5 One view" considers a complaint sufficient only if it has
alleged enough of the circumstances, even though sketchily, to bring
compensability within the realm of probable cause." The other
view 8 would sustain the complaint unless it showed on its face that
the pleader had no compensable claim. The Arkansas case pre-
viously described would certainly satisfy the second test and proba-
bly the first.
The version of rule 8(a) proposed by the Civil Procedure Revi-
sion Commission used the language, "a statement in ordinary and
concise language of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,"79 which is essentially the same as the federal version. The
citation to Conley v. Gibson" in the reporter's notes' suggests that
the second view of the test of sufficiency discussed earlier was in-
tended to apply. The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, modified
the proposed language to read, "a statement in ordinary and concise
language of facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,"' and
thus the court retained the previous Arkansas construction of
"facts." The retention without change of the reporter's notes refer-
ring to Conley, however, seems to indicate that some liberalization
is intended.8 3 Time will tell. While a verbatim adoption of the lan-
guage of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and the gloss that went with it would
74. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 60, at § 2.11; see also C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS,
§ 67 (3d ed. 1976).
75. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 60, at § 2.11.
76. Id. (citing Hoshman v. Esso Stand. Oil Co., 263 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1959)).
77. See Garcia v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 5 (D.P.R. 1951). A defamation
complaint which failed to allege publication was upheld on a motion to dismiss because it
was sufficiently implied that the plaintiff would attempt to prove publication.
78. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 60, at § 2.11 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41 (1957)).
79. (Emphasis added).
80. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
81. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 8, Reporters' Note 1.
82. ARK. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (emphasis added).
83. ARK. R. Civ. P. 8, Reporters' Note 1.
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certainly have been desirable from the standpoint of clarity, a less
permissive approach is not necessarily bad. Applied intelligently,
this would at least give the parties an opportunity to secure a ruling
as to what the plaintiff will have to prove in order to recover and
should cause no hardship if amendments are freely allowed. The
arguments to the contrary usually assume that all of this can be
done through other pretrial devices and discovery, but this can be
expensive. In any event, the abandonment of the phrase "cause of
action" in this section would seem to give the court some room to
improve the previous law regarding sufficiency of pleadings.
VI. CONCLUSION
As noted earlier, this comment is not a comprehensive review
of the 1979 Civil Procedure Rules; it merely highlights some of the
changes that are embodied in the Rules of Civil Procedure for cir-
cuit, chancery, and probate courts. Priority has been given to fea-
tures which might not be apparent on the face of the 1979 Rules of
Civil Procedure or the Reporters' Notes thereto. Special emphasis
has been placed on certain court modifications of the Civil Proce-
dure Revision Committee's proposals. Some of these changes in-
clude the expansion of the rules to include discovery of liability
insurance coverage, the revision of the rules that relate to deposition
upon written questions, and the simplification of the permissive
joinder rules.
The differences between the 1979 Civil Procedure Rules and
their federal counterparts, for the most part, are based on a desire
to retain former Arkansas practices and to accommodate Arkansas
statutory and constitutional limitations. The new rules retain not
only the separation of law and equity but also the trial procedure
whereby jury instructions are given prior to argument of counsel.
Likewise, the Federal Rule which governs class actions has been
modified to follow former Arkansas procedure. Because of the reten-
tion of Arkansas rules which differ from their federal counterparts,
the transition to the 1979 Rules of Civil Procedure may be made
more easily by the Arkansas practitioner.
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